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PARTY SYSTEMS 
 
 
 
The article confirms the hypothesis that 
a multiplicity of parties of the European 
and national levels forms the party system 
of the European Union (EU). The authors 
describe the main characteristics of Eu-
roparties and political groups comprised of 
them as key actors in the European Par-
liament’s (EP) political and legislative 
processes. The authors adopt the institu-
tional approach and make use of the tools 
of the comparative, structural, and func-
tional analyses. Special attention is paid to 
the ‘two-tier’ structure — the connection 
between national and supranational institu-
tions — as a key feature of the European 
Union’s party system. The study is based on 
the European Parliament framework laws, 
election results, Europarties’ political pro-
grammes, as well as on the comparison of 
the composition of the Europarties and the 
EU bodies. The analysis provides a new 
perspective on the major processes and 
contradictions in the functioning of the 
European Parliament and demonstrates 
that the transformation of the EU from an 
intergovernmental association to a 
(con)federation has not been completed yet. 
 
Key words: European parliament, Eu-
roparty, political group, party system, elec-
toral system 
 
Amid the development of regional 
economic and political alliances, it is 
increasingly important to study political 
institutions responsible for representa-
tion, harmonisation of interests, and 
decision-making at supranational level 
within intergovernmental integration. 
Transboundary economic cooperation 
provides the impetus for regional poli-
tical integration. However, organising 
optimal decision-making processes at 
supranational level remains a problem. 
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This necessitates studying the development of the European Parliament (EP) 
and the role of political parties comprising the supranational party system of 
the European Union, ensuring decision-making, and legitimising these deci-
sions based on interest representation. 
 
Structural and functional features of Europarties 
 
Key agents of political process taking place in the European Parliament 
are political groups consisting of European-level parties (Europarties)1. Euro-
parties are umbrella organisations bringing together national parties commit-
ted to a common ideology and political programme [14]. Individual mem-
bership in Europarties is also possible for members of national parliaments 
and the EP. 
During EP elections, voters elect only national parties — some the of 
them constitute Europarties, others act without the support of the latter. Na-
tional parties compete for votes allocated to each country within the national 
apportionment of MEP seats. Thus, election campaigns focus primarily on 
national agendas [15]. 
Europarties are financed by the EU funds and private donations. They 
have the right to campaign at European level2. Funds are allocated in line 
with the objectives stated in the political programmes of Europarties. 
A key characteristic of Europarties is their two-tier structure, which in-
cludes national and supranational components. National parties serve as 
channels for recruiting members of the political elite, who interact with elec-
toral groups in EU member states through representing their interests. Fur-
ther, national parties set up Europarties, which influence the formation of 
coalitions and the functioning of the EU governing bodies. 
This particularity is a result of the conditions, in which Europarties de-
velop in the EU — an intergovernmental association, which has created a 
system of supranational coordinating and governing institutions. In this 
sense, the European Parliament — as well as the European-level party-
building process — is of a partly artificial nature. Its emergence was not a 
result of political struggle and its gradual institutionalisation, which shaped 
modern institutions of parliamentarism and political parties. It is a product of 
agreements between states and political elites, a result of ‘political enginee-
ring’ at the supranational level [6; 10]. Thus, the question of long-term stabi-
lity and independence of supranational EU institutions remains relevant. 
Increasing international integration requires securing its legitimacy from 
citizens of European countries, which necessitated the transition to direct EP 
                                                     
1 For the first time, the notion of Europarty was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992: ‘Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration 
within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to express-
ing the political will of the citizens of the Union’ (Article 138a). The Treaty of Am-
sterdam (1997) laid down Europarty financing rules. The Treaty of Nice (2001) 
specified that ‘The Council… shall lay down the regulations governing political par-
ties at European level and in particular the rules regarding their funding’. 
2 This right is governed by EU Regulation No. 1624/2007 (2007). Allocated funds 
cover administrative costs and expenditure relating to technical support, meetings, 
research, awareness campaign, etc.  
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elections in 1979. This provided the impetus for political struggle and coali-
tion formation in the framework of European integration institutions. As 
European level coalitions of national parties, Europarties had been develop-
ing long before their formalisation in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. 
In the 1970s, the first three Europarties emerged. These were the Euro-
pean People’s Party, Party of European Socialists, European Liberal Democ-
rat and Reform Party. They did not have a strict organisational structure; 
their coordination was carried out by regular congresses. The weakness of 
party hierarchy was reflected in Europarty manifestos, often featuring vague 
or openly populist statements. Gradually, the political party spectrum be-
came diverse, as new Europarties emerged (the far-right, the green, regional-
ists, etc.). The new Europarties strived to reach a coordinated position for EP 
elections. At the same time, due to a weak organisational structure and 
vagueness of their political programmes, Europarties largely depended on 
the supranational institutions of the EU [26]. 
Despite the rather low political status of Europarties, they fulfilled a 
number of important functions, including raising awareness of European 
processes among voters in the course of EP elections, mitigating differences 
between national parties at European level, etc. As Europarties developed, 
they started to coordinate and structure their ideological platforms, thus con-
tributing to the formation of the EP based on the political and ideological 
rather than the national principle3. 
In effect, the gradual convergence of national parties brought together by 
a similar ideology in the framework of European integration processes has 
been taking place since the establishment of the EP. The transition to direct 
EP elections in 1979 provided the final impetus for these processes. 
In 1990—2000, as European integration was developing and Europarties 
were being formalised, the objective of coordination was replaced by that of 
creating a common election platform and political branding. Europarties’ 
function of forming party groups in the EP crystallised during that period. 
Without Europarties, the process of party grouping in the EP would be 
chaotic, the configuration of groups would change after each election, and 
parliamentary discussion would be dominated by national agendas. At the 
same time, Europarties still lack direct interaction with voters, and this fact 
reduces their role in legitimising of the European Parliament. Special atten-
tion should be paid to the transformation of national parties into Europarties 
in new EU member states. The political competition space expands with 
each new wave of European integration and new parties are created [3—5]. 
The functions of Europarties are not limited to the formation of political 
groups. Europarties can influence EU governing bodies and decision-making 
processes in several ways. Firstly, Europarties participate in coordination 
meetings with heads of state and government (influence on the European 
Council). Secondly, the positions of Europarties and affiliated European 
                                                     
3 Nation-based grouping of parties in the EP is impossible due to the institutional 
barrier requiring that each EP party group include MEPs from at least seven EU 
countries. Structuring of political movements at the supranational level make it pos-
sible for Europarties to set up party efficient groups through amalgamating several 
Europarties with a similar political and ideological platform. 
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Commission members are coordinated. Europarties also influence the politi-
cal process through supporting their EC candidates [27]. The Treaty of Lis-
bon governs the right of Europarties holding the majority of votes to put up a 
candidate for the position of President of European Commission. In 2014, 
the European People’s Party used this option to nominate Donald Tusk for 
the position of President of European Council. Thus, Europarties can influ-
ence EU governing bodies through delegating their members. A comparative 
analysis of Europarty representation in EU supranational structures is one of 
the indicators taken into account when evaluating their influence (table 1). 
A comparative analysis shows that there are four leading parties (EPP, 
PES, ALDE, AECR) accounting for 70 % seats in the European Parliament. 
Members of the Big Four hold 29 out of 30 seats in the European Council and 
all Commissioner Offices in the European Commission. The other 11 Euro-
parties account for approximately 20 % MEP seats and 1 member of the Euro-
pean Council. 
The financing of Europarties out of EU funds is rather limited (the larg-
est Europarty — the EPP — receives approximately 8m euros and the small-
est — AENM — only 0.35m; these moneys cover three-year salary of a 
MEP [13]). However, Europarties can accept private donations of 12,000 euro 
per year [11] and donations from national parties, if the total sum does not 
exceed 40 % of their annual budget. 
From the perspective of internal structure of Europarties is characterised 
by a weak structure suggesting that PMs can vote in the European Parlia-
ment and adoption of legislation depends on compromises both between and 
within political groups. This reduces the significance of the Europarties, 
which cannot have a top-down influence on election results. At the same 
time, this does not reduce the risk of a parliamentary crisis, when strictly 
disciplined groups would block each other’s initiatives. 
Therefore, one of the key functions of Europarties is taking part in the 
legislative process through forming political groups in the EP. MEPs join 
such groups in accordance with their party affiliation [7]. Forming a political 
group requires at least 25 MEPs representing at least one fifth of the EU 
member states. According to the results of 2014 elections, eight political 
groups and independent MEPs work in the European Parliament. Party 
groups are key actors in the EP political process. Thus, the key indicator 
used when analysing the balance of political forces in the European Parlia-
ment is the proportion of seats held by each group rather than by each Eu-
roparty separately (table 2). 
Party groups develop a consolidated position, which is not binding dur-
ing the vote, in line with the political and ideological priorities of party 
groups. Political groups also participate in the work of committees preparing 
amendments to legislative acts considered by the EP. Party groups play an 
important role in organising the functioning of the EP. In particular, a con-
ference of group presidents appoints members of committees, formulates 
agendas for parliamentary sessions, etc. Political groups can also create joint 
workgroups for informal exchange of opinions between different political 
forces in the European Parliament [1]. 
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European-level (supranational) party system 
 
The ‘two-tier’ structure of European-level party organisations stirred 
heated debates among researchers focusing on the particularities of the EU 
party system1. The problem is that Europarties do not openly compete with 
each other during EP elections. Some researchers stress the lack of a cohe-
sive system of European-level party representation due to the limits to citi-
zens’ participation in EP elections imposed by national borders [17]. Voters 
elect national rather than European-level parties, although the latter run mas-
sive European campaigns. Moreover, Europarties compete with each other 
through the mediation of national parties for seats in the European Parlia-
ment, which affects the balance of forces after the formation of political 
groups. Creating political groups, Europarties compete in the European Par-
liament for the influence on Union-level decision-making [24]. 
The classical definition of the party system formulated by M. Duverge2 
suggests the following criteria for identifying an aggregate of parties as a 
party system — presence of a party structure, relative stability of connec-
tions between party organisations, and dynamic interactions between them 
(competition). A combination of these characteristics grants ‘access’ to rep-
resenting interests of voters in the Parliament, which participates in EU gov-
ernance. 
The European-level party system meets these criteria, although it is not 
completely identical to a typical national party system. Europarties interact 
in the European Parliament, where they form political groups, which influ-
ence the legislative process in the EU and the operation of the EU governing 
bodies and compete with the other Europarties and political groups. There-
fore, there is a supranational party system, within which Europarties interact 
and compete at the level of the European Parliament. At the same time, 
communication with voters is conducted through the constituent national 
parties, whereas Europarties act as mediators in the course of political group 
formation (national parties — European parties — political groups). 
Thus, the EU party system has both similarities to, and difference from, 
national party systems. However, using this term in the context of the EU is 
justified, since Europarties compete with each other and their interaction 
produces a ‘system effect’, i. e. legitimises the functioning of the European 
Parliament. 
The EU party system consisting of 15 Europarties and including perma-
nent members — national parties of EU member states — can be considered 
as a multi-party system. This corresponds to Duverger’s law stating that pro-
portional representation tends to favour multipartism, which is observed at 
the levels of both national party system and the EU [2]. 
                                                     
1 This article treats the term ‘European-level party system’ as synonym for the ‘EU 
party system’. 
2 ‘In every country, over a relatively long period of time, there is a certain stability 
in the number of parties, their internal structures, their ideologies, even their respec-
tive sizes, alliances, and types of opposition’ [2, p. 31]. 
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An important feature is that no political force has an absolute parliamen-
tary majority in the European Parliament (above 50 % of votes). Primarily, 
this is a result of national party systems translated to European level. As 
mentioned above, the total number of Europarties (both parliamentary and 
those without representation in the EP) is fifteen. Such diversity is created by 
the pluralism of political programmes and agendas of national parties and the 
erosion of class structure in European societies. As a result, no political plat-
form promoted by Europarties can win a majority of European votes. 
It is also important to consider another feature of European parties. Some 
less influential national parties with small representation in national parlia-
ments can have large political representation in the European Parliament, 
which gives them an opportunity to influence European political processes 
[9]. For instance, in the 2014 EP elections, Marine Le Pen’s National Front 
won in France, the Danish People’s Party in Denmark, the UK Independence 
Party in the UK, etc. Of course, the impressive performance of these parties 
is accounted for by growing Euroscepticism in the EU amid the financial 
crisis and migration problems. However, winning EP elections does not 
mean a victory at the national level [23]. A statistical analysis of voters’ be-
haviour in EP elections fits in the ‘second-order election’ pattern. This 
means that voters view elections to the EP as an interim confidence referen-
dum and a chance to voice protest against the ruling national parties and the 
policies of supranational institutions of the EU [16]. In general, the differ-
ence between the results of leading national parties in national and EP elec-
tions is approximately 40 %. 
The impressive results of oppositional parties in European-level elec-
tions are accounted for by the particularities of the EU election system, 
namely, its two-tier structure [12]. Its supranational components include the 
following common rules. MEPs are directly elected in each EU member 
state based on the proportionality principle. The election threshold in mem-
ber states is 5 % of the total vote. These conditions crate a favourable situa-
tion for less influential parties of second and third rank to secure representa-
tion in the European Parliament. 
The national level is regulated by the laws of EU member states. Each 
state determines the number of constituencies. An up to 5 % election thresh-
old is set by each member state (in some countries, the threshold does not 
apply). In all countries, candidates are nominated by political parties (na-
tional parties of member states put up candidates and hold election cam-
paigns [14]). However, some countries nominate independent MPs (for in-
stance, Poland and Ireland). In different countries, seats are distributed using 
disparate methods, including the highest averages method, the Hare quota, 
the Droop quota, the Webster/Sainte-Laguë method, and others. Moreover, 
voting age also ranges from 18 to 25 years [8]. 
Thus, the election system combining national and supranational elements 
accounts for the particularities of the structure and functioning of the supra-
national party system. Moreover, it is closely connected with the two-tier 
system of the latter and a significant number of parties at European level. 
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Conclusions 
 
A combination of national and European institutions creates a complex 
multi-tier system of political relations in the European Parliament and the 
EU in general. Organisational structures and stable competitive interaction 
between Europarties in the European Parliament support the hypothesis 
about the development of a supranational party system in the EU. 
The EU is an intergovernmental association, which has developed a 
complex system of supranational political institutions. These institutions are 
coordinated with and sometimes opposed to the political bodies of EU mem-
ber states. These factors explain the key features of the functioning of the EP 
and the EU party system — the two-tier structure of Europarties and the EU 
party and election system combining national and supranational components. 
There are a number of secondary characteristics — the intermediary function 
of Europarties bringing together national parties and parliamentary political 
groups, the absence of a parliamentary majority in the EP, the impressive 
performance of oppositional national parties in European elections ac-
counted for by typical models of voters’ behaviour, etc. 
A comparative analysis shows that the influence of Europarties is dis-
tributed unevenly in the European Parliament. Four centrist parties account 
for the majority of EP seats and have the largest representation in EU gov-
erning bodies. As a result, the leading parties have significant administrative 
resources and they are closely connected with supranational EU structures. 
In their turn, small Europarties have little administrative impact on the EU 
governing bodies and they often represent the extremes of the political spec-
trum, sometimes espousing Euroscepticism. 
Despite their gradual structuring and ideological grouping, Europarties 
still depend on political groups in the legislative process and national parties 
in the election process. Today, Europarties fulfil a number of important po-
litical and integration functions. However, they are not major drivers behind 
European integration and they are unlikely to become ones in the near future 
due to the lack of institutional tools of direct influence and the absence of 
direct communication with voters. 
One of the ways to strengthen the role of Europarties could be creating a 
European constituency distributing a certain proportion of EP seats (10 % is 
often proposed) among Europarties. Direct participation in elections within 
the European constituency would bring European institutions closer to EU 
citizens. Voters would have an opportunity to vote for candidates from other 
countries, which would strengthen the institution of European citizenship 
and contribute to the European agenda in the European Parliament, which 
still serves as a platform to many MEPs to promote national rather than 
European interests. 
At the same time, this reform would be associated with significant risks — 
establishing a European constituency would open up additional political op-
portunities for large European parties at the expense of small national par-
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ties. Large, well-known Europarties will enjoy significant support within 
such constituency thus reducing the actual spectrum of voters from EU 
member states represented in the European Parliament. 
These characteristics suggest that the political transformation of the EU 
from an intergovernmental association to a (con)federation has not com-
pleted yet. A complex system of institutions and coordination of interests in 
the framework of the European Parliament and the EU decelerates and de-
centralises the decision-making process. This results in disagreements be-
tween the European institutions and the national governments of EU member 
states. The latter are associated with concentrated authority and clearly for-
mulated national interests, which encourages them to influence European-
level decision-making so that it meets the national interests. These complica-
tions can be overcome through either developing European integration (for 
instance, establishing a European constituency) or partially ‘liberating’ na-
tional governments from supranational EU structures. 
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